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The answers of the Ministers, sent to parliament on June 18, and the hearing of experts held the subsequent day, must have reassured most MPs because a majority of them endorsed the mission on June 27. It is expected that the troops will deployed by mid-August.

The troops, 1100 in total, will be stationed in the southern province of Al Muthanna. Although the Dutch unit will operate under British command, formally it is not part of the occupying forces. Instead, it pertains to the so-called “stabilisation force” (SFIR) authorised by UN resolution 1483, which calls upon member-states to contribute to the “stabilisation and security” of Iraq. Apart from the Netherlands, other countries that have agreed to participate in SFIR include Poland and Japan whereas India recently decided not to sent any troops, unless a more explicit UN mandate were to materialize.

Of course, the mission is not without risks. As the ongoing assaults on US troops in and around Baghdad and the recent killing of six British troops indicate, post-Saddam Iraq is all but stable and secure. Nonetheless, the Dutch government assured MPs, “the security situation in the South of Iraq may be described as reasonably stable”.  Elsewhere (in an article co-authored with Pim van Harten[1]), we have argued that the Dutch government has painted an all too rosy picture of the security situation in Southern Iraq as it did not pay due regard to the political risks involved in the operation.

Here, we take issue with the government’s account of the recent war effort in South Iraq and its repercussions for the safety of civilians and army personnel in the area. In particular, we contest the government’s claim that “no significant fighting has taken place in the province of Al Muthanna”[2] and, more specifically, its assertion that “no DU [i.e. depleted uranium[3]] ammunition was deployed [in the province]”  during the recent conflict[4]. We observe that on both accounts the government has misinformed parliament. As a result, we conclude, neither members of parliament nor the troops sent to Iraq have been able to make an adequate judgement on the risks of exposure to DU contamination.

The assertion that no significant fighting took place in the area is so blatantly belied by open sources, that one wonders if any of the Ministers ever reads a newspaper. The capital of the province, As Samawah, is strategically located on the road from Basra to Baghdad, providing access to a bridge over the Euphrates river. Consequently, on its march to Baghdad, the US army anticipated some resistance there.  In fact, it would encounter rather fierce resistance both from Iraqi forces, including Saddam Fedayeen paramilitaries and Baath party militias, as well as a group of Syrian volunteers, according to American officers[5]. Reportedly, it took just one day to take the bridge but more than a week before the town and the road were cleared of all ‘pockets of resistance’[6]. 112 civilians, most of them inhabitants of As Samawah, were killed in the battle[7].  Even then, violence did not cease: in the first week of April, a suicide squat drove into an American roadblock just outside As Samawah, detonating a load of propane-filled bottles[8].

Despite such incidents, the Dutch government persists in depicting Al Muthanna as a remote, barely inhabited desert where no noteworthy events have occurred.  In fact, the majority of the province’s population lives on the banks of the Euphrates river along the road between Najaf and Nassiriya (about 100 kilometers, respectively, to the north and south).  Inhabitants of the capital As Samawah maintain close relationships with these cities and, somewhat farther away, Kerbala and Basra.  Thus, As Samawah but also smaller towns such as Al Khidr, directly partake in regional social and economic activities and were, as far as recent military activities are concerned, part and parcel of the ‘theatre of operations’.

For that matter, the assertion of the Dutch government that “no DU ammunition was deployed in Al-Muthanna" is also unfounded. If this assertion is based on information it received from US officials, as the government claims, it has been deceived.  On the 12th of March, about a week before his troops set foot on Iraqi soil, Major General “Buff” Buford Blount III, commander of the US army 3rd Infantry Division already conveyed in an interview with Le Monde that “if we receive the order to attack, final preparations will only take a few days. We have already begun to unwrap our depleted uranium anti-tank shells.”[9] That order came shortly, and as the Division advanced to Baghdad along the Euphrates, its Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) did not leave their unwrapped DU-shells sit idle on the way. On March 26, at CENTCOM Headquarters, General Brooks admitted as much, although he stressed that only “a very small portion of our munitions [contain] depleted uranium”[10].

Be that as it may, it is a fact that DU-ammunition has been widely used during operation “Iraqi Freedom”, also in Southern Iraq. The province of Al Muthanna is no exception: the usage of DU-ammunition there has been confirmed by US troops and ‘embedded’ journalists.  In a widely distributed field message, Sergeant First Class (SFC) Cooper reports that the weapon systems used by the 3rd Infantry 7th Cavalry en route to As Samawah and on to Najaf, “are performing well, especially the 25mm DU and 7.62”[11].  In a letter sent home, E. Pennell, crew member on a BFV of the 1st Infantry Battallion, 41st Infantry regiment, describes how his crew fires a 25 mm DU-round as they encounter seven enemy troops in the town of As Samawah: “We fire five rounds. The first one is a depleted uranium due to standard operating procedures”, adding that “DU is designed to penetrate enemy armour”[12]. 

Such reports suggest that DU ammunition was routinely employed in encounters with armoured enemy vehicles, also in urban environments. What is more, it appears that DU ammunition has not been reserved exclusively for designated armoured targets.  A journalist embedded with the 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment as it approached the city of Najaf, describes how a Bradley gunner made its first enemy contact in the war: “[Sergeant Bryce] Ivings spotted a man moving furtively around a commercial building, about thousand meters away. American tanks opened fire.  In support, Ivings fired his 25 mm cannon, equipped with high explosive, depleted uranium shells.  ‘Wow, look at that’ Ivings said, as two basketball-sized holes open up in the building.  He fired again, knocking down the wall. ‘Whoa, that was awesome’.”[13]

In another report, an RFE/RL correspondent embedded with the 3rd Infantry Division describes the horrifying effects of 25-millimeter DU ammunition fired at a Nissan pickup truck with six Iraqi soldiers who were driving it straight at a US position near Tallil: “These Iraqi regular-army soldiers had RPGs and fired two of these rocket-propelled grenades at the US positions, when a US Bradley troop carrier using this depleted-uranium ammunition opened fire on it from about 30 to 35 meters away. If you can imagine what a human being looks like melting when being hit by this ammunition, there wasn't much left of these people other than the charred remains of their skeletons. One Iraqi soldier who was out of the vehicle at the time about 15 meters back from the vehicle was killed just from the concussion of the blast”[14].

Whereas the deployment DU ammunition on the ground may have been subject to some operational restrictions, airborne DU ordnance has been fired less discriminately. The aircraft of choice for close air support to ground battles has been the A-10 “Wharthog” jet, notorious for its anti-tank missiles and its lethal 30 mm cannons that can fire up to 4200 rounds per minute.  Accordingly, the aircraft is designed to carry lots of ammunition, both DU as well as ‘conventional’, high explosive (HE) rounds, typically fed into its guns in a mix of 5/6 or 5/8 (DU/HE)[15].  Data released by the US Air Force recently, establish that the Warthogs have shot 311,597 rounds of 30 mm ordnance during the war[16], which would suggest that they have delivered at least 194,748 DU rounds. As each cartridge contains just over 300 grams of depleted uranium, this amounts to a minimum release of 58,814 kilograms of DU[17].

In Southern Iraq the Warthogs have played an important, supporting role in efforts to control strategic locations such as Tallil airbase and the bridges over the Euphrates. In the battle of Samawah, too, Warthogs have been called in to help ground troops mop up resistance and capture the two bridges there. In one of the incidences, vehicles of the 3rd Infantry 7th Cavalry reportedly drew friendly fire from Warthog aircraft, during a strike on a junk yard in town: “The roar of jets grows and A-10 ground attack aircraft fly into view. These slow-moving aircraft carry a devastating 30 mm Gatling gun in the nose as well as Hellfire air-to-ground missiles. The gun's firing sounds like tearing cloth. The local commander shouts over the radio for the convoy to halt and clear the area…[However,] a number of vehicles fail to hear the warning and continue on through town and are shot as they run a gantlet of fire.”[18] 

Somewhat farther north along the Euphrates, between As Samawah and Najaf, Lt. Col. Terry Ferrell, commander of the 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment summons the Air Force for support when, at dusk on the 24th of March, his troops run into Iraqi positions on the banks of the river. As Sean D. Taylor, a staff writer with the Army Times recalls it: “The night reverberated with the banging of Bradley chain guns pouring 25mm high-explosive shells into the Iraqi positions. A pair of A-10 Warthog ground-attack planes showed up on station within minutes, dropping bombs and then strafing the enemy position with 30mm cannon fire that hit with a series of white phosphorescent explosions”[19].

Since the US government has so far not disclosed any exact numbers, it is yet unknown just how much DU has been used in the war. The British government has been a bit more forthcoming, admitting that British Challenger tanks expended 1.9 tons of DU (approximately twice as much as in the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict)[20]. On the basis of the available information, Dan Fahey, an independent DU expert, estimates that 100-200 tons of DU may have been released during combat[21]. If true, this would be significantly less than the total of approximately 290 tons shot in 1991.  However, as Mr Fahey and others note, this time a larger share of the expenditure appears to have occurred in or around urban areas and, thus, increasing the potential for civilian exposure to DU[22]. 

Indeed, all over Iraq, the remains of spent DU shells and DU-contaminated debris have been found littering the streets in urban areas[23].  Some wrecked vehicles have been towed away, and the most obvious contaminated sites are marked.  However, most locations have not even been identified let alone cleaned, even though there is a widely shared consensus that DU contamination can be a potential health hazard.

After all, DU is a radioactive and toxic heavy metal which, like any other metal, is disposed to corrode and may, therefore, end up in the water supply or food chain[24]. However, apart from that, DU ammunition and armour ignites on impact, resulting in a very fine, radioactive and toxic dust that can be inhaled or ingested.  Once in the body, DU may cause harm due to the exposure of internal organs to its chemical toxicity, radiation or the combined effects of both[25].

As yet, though, little is known about the long-term health effects of exposure to DU contamination. To minimize the risk of exposure, US and UK troops have been instructed to stay away from potentially contaminated areas as much as possible or to wear, at least, respiratory protection and gloves when it is inevitable to enter such sites[26]. British safety instructions further provide that troops should not climb on or into vehicles or structures possibly hit by DU rounds; touch, pick up or retain souvenirs from struck vehicles or DU fragments; and smoke, eat or drink near a target struck by DU. For the rest, troops are advised to keep their dust masks and gloves on until they have a chance to change clothes, and to wash their hands before eating, drinking or smoking[27].

We may assume that Iraqi civilians stand to bear the same health risks as US or UK troops.  However, there is no indication that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has properly informed the population about DU contamination.  The British Ministry of Defence merely affirms that Iraqi locals have been warned “that they should not go near or touch any debris they find on the battlefield”[28]. Perhaps this would have sufficed, were it not for the fact that quite a few battles have been fought in densely populated areas, where it is virtually impossible for residents to avoid all remnants of war. It is thus indispensable that DU contaminated debris is clearly marked, fenced off or, preferably, cleaned up, and that citizens receive proper safety instructions.

Now, at least the British government has agreed to provide details of UK DU firing locations to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and directly to recognised non-government organisations working on location[29].  It has also assumed some responsibility for clean-up and decontamination[30]. In contrast, the US government has so far denied any responsibility for DU clean-up in Iraq.  To date, it has also refused to disclose any information about the quantities and locations of DU expenditure or allow a UNEP Post Conflict Assessment Unit to study the environmental impact of DU contamination.

In fact, if we are to believe the Dutch government, the only specific information that the US authorities have disclosed so far is that no DU-ammunition has been used in the province of Al Muthanna.  As we have demonstrated, there is ample evidence to the contrary.  Consequently, either the Dutch government has deceived parliament or it has been misinformed by US authorities. Either way, the question remains as to how much DU has been fired and where exactly-both in Al Muthanna as well as Iraq at large. As long as such basic issues are not addressed, it is not possible to assess the health risks of DU contamination, let alone claim that these are negligible.

Of course, the lack of reliable information bears, before all, on concerns about the health and safety of the Iraqi population but it also implicates coalition troops and the newly arriving SFIR units. Dutch troops, the Minister of Defence has declared, “will avoid [DU-contaminated] areas and, if they are near such areas, they will take appropriate precautions”. Unfortunately, Dutch safety measures do not appear to be as comprehensive as those of the British or the Americans[31]. However, the main problem is that the troops only know of areas contaminated more than ten years ago, during the Gulf War in 1991. About areas that have been contaminated recently, they have received no information[32].

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