Toward a Common European Security Policy
| | RISQ Reviews | 15 May 2003 |
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Author: Erol Hofmans
At a meeting in the Egmont Palace in Brussels on 29 April 2003, the leaders of Germany, France, Luxembourg and Belgium agreed on giving new impetus to the construction of a Europe of Security and Defence. Among other things, they stated that the European Union must have a credible security and defence policy; called for a ‘general clause of solidarity and common security binding all member states’; and called on the Convention to consider the founding of a European Security and Defence Union (ESDU), for those member states that would want to speed up the strengthening of their defence cooperation.
What was remarkable about this meeting was not the fact that it gathered only four of the fifteen member states of the European Union - in this sense, it was a clear gesture towards those member states that gave political support to the United States in its military action against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. But the focus on defence cooperation (it was even called a “European Defence Meeting”) and the suggestion that a strengthened and integrated defence organisation directly provides the security policy of the European Union, is however remarkable because it seems to mimic the philosophy of the United States, that military capabilities equals security. Although the meeting called for the new system to have a strong link with the United Nations structures, it failed to mention how cooperation with the United Nations could contribute to the development of a comprehensive security policy.
In 2001, the European Commission presented its Communication on Conflict Prevention . It was the first comprehensive attempt by the EU to address the importance of proactively institutionalize a policy of peace building in the external relations of the EU. It called for projecting stability, reacting quickly to nascent conflicts, and enhancing international co-operation on conflict prevention. It pointed out that the capacity of the EU for acting in response to conflicts is dependent on a clear definition of the Union’s objectives, the capacity to act, as well as the political will to act.
Here, I put forward a new distinction to clarify the Union’s objectives in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. Through a comprehensive perspective of the concept of security, it will become clear that security encompasses both conflict prevention, or proactive security policy; and crisis management, or responsive security policy.
Next to this distinction, the role of civil society should be highlighted since they offer the overall clockwork of EU Foreign Policy.
This new understanding can serve as a guide to create a more integrated and coordinated division of responsibilities which can then be translated into an effective inter-institutional framework for a strong foreign policy of the EU, a Common European Security Policy (CESP).
On Security
Foreign policy should be conducted to provide security. Therefore, the notion of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is fluid in its distinction and this distinction is used to highlight - sometimes not fully developed - nuances.
However, one needs to look at what constitutes security. I have expressed the belief that “Security is not how well you can defend yourself. It is about how safe you feel” . Here, I will elaborate on the concept of security, and the variety of terminology used. This will bring us to a comprehensive understanding of the concept, so that its field of policy in the context of the European Union and its institutions will provide a clear division of tasks.
There are several terms linked to the concept of security. There is collective security, common security, cooperative security, human security, and national and state security.
Collective security is understood as the agreement of a group to jointly punish aggression committed by any of them against any other in the group. This is different from collective defense, which is understood as the joint organization of defense (alliance) as in e.g. NATO.
Common security is understood as a program for action based on the view that security is an international problem shared among adversaries rather than a national problem of any one country, and that traditional measures which increase the security of one state (or group) at the expense of another exacerbate the problem rather than solving it. The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues has explained common security as a confirmation that “All states have a right to security. … International peace must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than a threat of mutual destruction” .
The concept of cooperative security has two main characteristics: confidence-building measures, and equity. In the NATO Final Communiqué of the Brussels Ministerial in 1990, one of NATO’s aims was “…expanding our active search for a co-operative approach to security…” . Cooperative security has come to be expressed as policies of governments or organized groups which reflect the attitudes of former adversaries - or of parties which consider each other to be potential adversaries - to the present and future relationship between them, and which they seek to shift from a more to a less conflictual mode. According to Janne Nolan, “One has to rely on a continuous demonstration that agreements entered are actually complied with, which could be effected by means of reassuring measures, and openness” . Olav Knudsen names four characteristics for cooperative security: inclusivity; weak confidence in the adversary; motivation to end confrontations; and demonstrated will to implement such a policy .
David Dewitt, however, calls for restraint of such a distinct division: “…all three notions - comprehensive security, common security, and cooperative security - share many common features. Thus any attempt to differentiate between them runs the risk of drawing artificial boundaries” .
The WEU, in a report of its forty-seventh session, calls for a comprehensive security concept to “also determine where defence policy and individual and collective defence fit in with such a broad approach. The relationship between ‘security’ and ‘defence’ needs to be redefined” . It also calls for a concept of security that is inclusive to the interests of all European states rather than only the EU Member States or the WEU states.
Then there are the notions of human security and national and state security. The Report of the Commission on Global Governance articulated the distinction between the security of states and the security of people . Kofi Annan also expressed the nuance well: “Peace means much more than the absence of war. Human security can no longer be understood in purely military terms. Rather, it must encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law” .
How can this variety of terminology on security be applied to the foreign policy of the EU? One way to do this is by creating a distinction between proactive and responsive security policy. Even though this distinction is fluid, it is helpful for the division of responsibilities between the different institutions supporting the foreign policy of the EU.
Proactive Security Policy: Conflict Prevention
There exists a general definition of conflict prevention as “encompassing all measures aimed at preventing the escalation of tensions into armed conflict, as well as measures taken post-armed conflict aimed at preventing the reoccurring of the conflict” .
I see this definition as explaining several factors of crisis management rather than explaining conflict prevention, for it talks of responding to an already existing tension rather than investing the prevention of that tension and possible subsequent armed conflict.
Measures taken post-armed conflict, also known as measures of post-conflict rehabilitation, are also part of crisis management, for they are focused on the prevention of the reoccurring of a particular conflict rather than the projection of stability in the general external relations.
Although development co-operation is part of conflict prevention and plays a strong role in post-conflict rehabilitation, its focus should shift from responsive to proactive.
I therefore propose a new definition of conflict prevention: all measures aimed at the projection of stability and the subsequent prevention of tensions and armed conflict, through the prioritization of a comprehensive understanding of security on all levels of foreign policy.
The Development and Peace Foundation talks of crisis prevention, which would include: gearing of development co-operation more strongly to the requirements of stabilization in crisis regions; reforming and expanding international organizations in line with co-operative security; and pursuing disarmament in the area of small arms and via regional demilitarization agreements. It would also involve creating an infrastructure for peaceful conflict management .
Rather than talking about crisis prevention and conflict management, I prefer the notions conflict prevention and crisis management. Indeed, it is the conflict itself one has to prevent from occurring; when tensions or armed conflict are happening, they create an overall crisis with humanitarian aspects which one has to manage. The International Crisis Group describes ‘humanitarian’ as including natural disasters , which in my definition are not part of conflict prevention or crisis management. Whereas crisis prevention is too broad a concept, the notion of conflict management is too narrow.
Conflict prevention includes all the proactive elements in foreign policy. For the EU, there are the elements proactive integration, proactive presence, and proactive programmes.
Proactive integration refers to the process of enlarging the structures and principles that express the EU model, which is done through the accession of new Member States. The positive effects of EU enlargement are economic, social and inter-ethnic development; a widened decision-making process in the EU; and the dissolution of the security vacuum in the Central and Eastern European countries. As the European Commission states, “In offering the prospect of European integration, the EU has already helped the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in their struggle to become stable democracies and functioning market economies”.
Proactive presence refers to the institutionalized diplomacy in its external relations by which the EU is represented with a common voice prioritizing stability. It includes statements by the chairmanship, Commission or High Representative, as well as the caucusing by the EU that is present in several international organizations of which the EU Member States take part in.
Proactive programmes are bilateral, regional or inter-organisational programmes that have a specific geographical or issue-oriented focus and are aimed at projecting stability in a structural sense. They include programmes funded by the European Commission Directorates General Development, Trade and External Relations, such as training for UN and OSCE Missions, election observation, human rights monitoring, the Country Strategy Papers, PHARE, TACIS, CARDS, MEDA, ALA, EIDHR; as well as programmes focused on addressing the causes of tension and violent conflict, such as the ones the European Commission mentions: drugs and crime, small arms, access to natural resources, environmental degradation, the spread of communicable diseases, population flows and human trafficking, and the role of the private sector in unstable areas.
Responsive Security Policy: Crisis Management
I define crisis management as all measures taken in response to tensions or armed conflict to prevent the escalation of tensions into armed conflict or to take measures towards the cessation of armed conflict, as well as measures taken in the field of humanitarian assistance and measures taken post-armed conflict aimed at preventing the reoccurring of the conflict.
The International Crisis Group, in its report ‘EU Crisis Response Capability’ , addresses the degree to which there is a basic fit between functional need and operational reality of the EU’s conflict prevention and conflict management capability. It uses the concept crisis response, which it defines as “a cycle of responses, corresponding to the different chronological stages through which crises and conflicts tend to move.
As it uses the concept crisis response, it tries to incorporate conflict prevention into this cycle. However, it calls peace building (conflict prevention) the most critical position in the cycle, and states that “If peace building can be carried out successfully before any conflict has erupted, the whole subsequent cycle of responses can be avoided”. The cycle is thus contradictory in itself, for it tries to incorporate a proactive policy into a responsive cycle.
The report does complement the Commission’s Communication on Conflict Prevention by giving an elaborate overview of processes which the EU could implement to make its responsive security policy more effective.
Crisis management includes all the responsive elements in foreign policy. For the EU, there are the elements responsive detection, coercian and deployment; responsive assistance; and responsive programmes.
Responsive detection, coercian and deployment refers to the variety of instruments the EU can use to prevent tensions from escalating into armed conflict, as well as instruments the EU can use to enforce a cessation of tensions or of armed conflict. First of all, the EU needs a well-functioning early warning mechanism, which requires a coordination of its worldwide presence (embassies and representations), the information exchange with specialized civil society organizations (CSOs), and the specialized elements within the institutions of the EU which have to translate this information into an effective response. Secondly, the EU needs to have an institutionalized policy planning element that defines the measures which can be directly implemented and which can function as a coercive force to halt tensions before they escalate into armed conflict; this requires the capability for coercive diplomacy and the implementation of a sanctions mechanism. Finally, the EU needs to have the military strength that gives weight to the coercian, which requires a clear definition of tasks between the EU and NATO, the UN and the OSCE; the military capability for an effective deployment; and the political will to implement the deployment of forces. This includes preventive deployment, peace enforcement and post-conflict civil/military assistance.
Responsive assistance refers to the planning and implementation of humanitarian assistance during a crisis situation that exists because of a tension or armed conflict. This requires an effective co-operation between the European institutions, especially the European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), and the ICRC, UNHCR, IOM and specialized CSOs, as well as an effective co-operation with the civil/military elements deployed in the crisis area.
Responsive programmes are post-conflict programmes that have a specific geographical focus and are aimed to bring stability directly after a crisis has occurred. A good example is the sphere of activities implemented under the coordination of the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Hercegovina, such as the provision of political stability, reconstruction of the region, rehabilitation of refugees, assistance in the cooperation with international organizations, and the monitoring of the democratization process and the human rights situation.
Civil Society
Civil society organizations can be powerful forces for promoting good governance and human rights and represent an important capacity for conflict prevention and crisis management.
According to Ernest Gellner, civil society can be understood as “The set of diverse non governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent it dominating and atomizing the rest of society” .
Civil society groups specifically oriented to working in conflict zones can be divided into: those supplying emergency relief and assistance; those working on medium to long term economic and social development issues; those concerned with social justice, human rights advocacy and monitoring; and those specifically focused on the non-violent resolution of conflict and long term peace building .
Conclusion: A Conceptual Framework for a Coherent Policy
There is a lack of coherence and efficiency on the executive level of the European Union’s external policy. This is due to an underdevelopment of the concept of security. My remark “Security is not how well you can defend yourself. It is about how safe you feel” is not intended to give a concrete definition to the concept. Rather, it gives credence to the fluidity of the concept, for the notion of a feeling of safety is similarly essentially contested; but it does want to point out that security can be understood in a broad, comprehensive manner, and not be centered around the organisation of defence alone.
For a coherent EU foreign policy, therefore, the conceptual framework that can be institutionalized is one where conflict prevention, or proactive security policy; and crisis management, or responsive security policy, form a guideline that leads to an inter-institutional framework and a Common European Security Policy. This CESP will be able to identify whether a policy is proactive or responsive, and can hence attribute the needed weight to the policy and subsequently make room for a balanced decision. Furthermore, a comprehensive understanding will identify more directly the techniques, resources, instruments and actions available to implement this decision.
A CESP does not require a sudden change in the architecture of the EU. The meaning is in the doing. It is a conceptual policy that in the longer term, as the EU integrates ever deeper, will form an essential part of a Europe in balance, a Europe in the world.
Published on 15 May 2003 by RISQ
© Erol Hofmans | www.risq.org
All rights reserved.
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