Convention must breathe life into EU's democratic character
| | RISQ Reviews | 22 April 2003 |
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Author: Ben Crum
 Improving the democratic character of the European Union was to be one of the main objectives of the Convention on the future of the EU. The Laeken declaration that set out its mandate underlined the need to bring the European institutions closer to the citizens: "The Union needs to become more democratic, more transparent and more efficient".
On 4 April the Convention's praesidium revealed the draft texts for the separate title that it proposes in the Constitutional Treaty on "the democratic life of the Union". In the light of the urgency expressed in the Laeken declaration, these articles turn out to be rather disappointing.
The proposed section opens with two articles, proclaiming respectively the principle of democratic equality and the principle of participatory democracy. Both these principles seem based on lofty ideals.
The one article in which the praesidium displays some substantive insight concerns the transparency of the Union's work. For the rest, the title includes articles on political parties that does not go beyond earlier resolutions on the topic, on the European ombudsman, and a separate article on the place of churches and non-confessional organisations in the Union.
Thus, in marked contrast to most of the work of the Convention, the title on democracy appears to lack any structuring philosophy. It is a mixed bag, bringing together some abstract principles and some specific provisions that might just as well be placed elsewhere in the treaty.
Notably, in presenting the title Convention vice-chair Dehaene conceded that it might be better renamed 'participatory democracy in the Union'. No renaming can however hide the underlying lack of substance.
The lack of a democratic vision on the part of the Convention's praesidium can well be explained by the way it has structured the Convention's work. While the Convention has debated many issues extensively in plenary and in specially designated working groups, the topic of European democracy has had no more than a cursory treatment.
Leading inevitably into the divisive issue of the Union's institutional structure, Convention chairman Valéry Giscard d'Estaing probably considered it wiser to keep the topic of democracy off the Convention's agenda. Nevertheless, that very strategy has also precluded the possibility that the elaboration of a common democratic vision might actually have provided some of the much-needed groundwork for a shared perspective on the Union's institutions. Instead it is now up to the Convention plenary to come up with a systematic alternative to the praesidium's uninspiring proposals. Given the diversity of the 105-strong forum, the time constraints it is under and absence of any previous debate, this will not be easy.
Still many of the Convention's earlier debates have already provided key elements to make it possible. If these elements are moved to the right place and their formulation is adequately revised, they can provide the proper basis for "the democratic life of the Union".
As a first step inserting the principle of effective representation will serve to underline the importance of subjecting the legislative process to the control of representative institutions. Under this principle, the rule that no European legislation can be adopted without the express consent of the European Parliament - already been endorsed by the Convention - can be re-instated. Complementary to that, legislative activity of governments in the Council needs to be fully open to scrutiny by the national parliaments.
A second, and probably more contestable step would be to insert the principle of executive power's democratic accountability. The implementation of European measures often eludes the public eye. This is first of all because most of it takes place in a highly decentralised fashion. A second reason is that executive power at the European level has often been insulated from political scrutiny.
There are good reasons for doing this. Yet, as found by the 1999 expert committee on mismanagement in the Commission, wherever accountability mechanisms are lacking, a culture of irregularities and irresponsibility may well develop. Besides the Commission these concerns apply just as well to other institutions that exercise power at the European level, such as the European Central Bank and the roles of the high representative for foreign affairs, Europol and Eurojust. One only has to imagine the effects of one administrative blunder by any of the above institutions to realise how little democratic legitimacy they can actually call upon.
While the principle of democratic accountability does not necessarily lead to putting these executive offices under direct Parliamentary control, it does point to a need to have the powers of these institutions properly ring-fenced by law. This would bind them to public disclosure of their activities and give the European Parliament the powers necessary to scrutinise them if it finds reason to do so. Principles of effective participation and accountability can provide the constitution's section on the democratic life of the Union with the vision and focus it so far lacks.
Once substantially improved, this title should also receive the constitutional place that it deserves - in front of the provisions on the Union institutions. At the moment it is a constitutional afterthought.
Ben Crum is a Marie Curie Research Fellow at CEPS.
 Founded in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is an independent policy research institute dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges facing Europe today.
This article © 2003 CEPS, first published in The European Voice
Published on 22 April 2003 by RISQ
© Ben Crum | www.risq.org
All rights reserved.
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