'La finca de los gringos': U.S. policy towards Latin America
| | RISQ Reviews | 14 January 2004 |
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Author: Pieter Smidt van Gelder
This essay provides a historical overview of the Monroe doctrine and its corollaries. Various examples of US intervention in Latin America are analysed: the Cold War cases Chile, Guatemala and Nicaragua and one ‘post Cold War’ example, Colombia.
Since the 19th century, the United States has tended to regard Latin American countries as their own backyard. In 1823, President Monroe declared that the Europeans should not attempt to intervene in the countries of Central and South America. This came to be known as the Monroe Doctrine. Interference in the domestic policy of these countries was deemed to be the exclusive right of the United States. Originally, this was originally directed primarily at the European superpowers, today it effectively means that there is a U.S. monopoly, or even the moral duty to interfere in Central and South American countries.
The Monroe Doctrine and its amendments.
The idea that the U.S. had special rights in Latin America is almost as old as the U.S. itself. Indeed, Thomas Jefferson declared that America had a hemisphere to itself. John Q. Adams, Secretary of State during the Monroe administration, provided the initial impetus to what came to be known as the Monroe Doctrine, by stating that the world should become accustomed to the idea that the U.S. considered the continent of America to be their rightful dominion. President Monroe subsequently stated this explicitly on 2 December 1823 during a speech to Congress. The situation in Latin America, where the colonies had revolted against Spain, motivated this public statement. Ferdinand VII, king of Spain, had asked for the help of his allies in the Great Alliance. Furthermore, Russian Czar Alexander I wanted to influence the western part of Latin America. When British foreign minister Canning proposed that the U.S. and the United Kingdom should prepare a common declaration against Spain, the United States at first reacted positively. However, John Q. Adams thought it would be wiser to act independently of this ally.
In fact, the Monroe Doctrine was indeed a declaration of independence with regard to U.S. foreign policy. America warned the European powers to not intervene in the American continent. Yet the U.S. also declared that it would not support revolutionary movements within Europe. In the meantime, however, the U.S. army was not really able to prevent European powers from actually interfering in Latin America.
Although the Monroe Doctrine was thus presented as a protection for the countries of Central and South America against an aggressive Europe, in the countries involved it was not considered as such. Rather, they instead regarded the doctrine as an expression of U.S. hegemony and its self-appointed right to intervene in their domestic affairs. In the end, the doctrine justified and even sanctified American interference in independent countries of the continent, which led Simón Bolívar to declare in 1829 that the United States seemed destined to plague and torment the continent in the name of freedom.
In 1848, President Polk added a clause to the Monroe Doctrine, which stated that even a voluntary transfer of land to another power would not be accepted by the U.S. Furthermore, in 1904, President Roosevelt declared that the U.S. was responsible for maintaining order in the Western hemisphere. In his view, chronic unlawful activity that would result in a general loosening of the ties of civilised society might ultimately lead to the need for intervention by some civilized nation. This nation was, of course, the United States of America. In the Western Hemisphere, the adherence of the U.S. to the Monroe Doctrine might force the U.S, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing, to the exercise of an international police power. The direct cause of this new formulation of the doctrine was the internal trouble in Colombia where the ‘1000-day war’ had torn apart conservatives and liberals. In the meantime, the U.S. tried to gain swift access between the two Oceans by digging a canal in Panama, which was then a province of Colombia. By failing to respect the needs and rights of the U.S, Colombia had apparently lost its connection with ‘civilized society’, which justified U.S. immediate action.[1]
One of the last amendments to the Monroe Doctrine was made in 1912 when senator Henry Cabot Lodge declared that the U.S. would not permit either if land in the Western Hemisphere would be transferred to an Asian power or a private company (he was thinking primarily of Japan). President Wilson - through his Secretary of State Lansing - put it most bluntly by stating that the U.S. would consider its own interests. Therefore, the integrity of other American nations was incidental, not an end.[2]
Wilson paid particular attention to the element of contractors and financiers. Latin America would rest on cooperation with those who act in the interest of peace and honour, who protect private rights. The private rights of U.S. companies to be sure. Naturally, European financiers did not blindly protect those rights. This amendment to the Monroe Doctrine was related to oil concessions in the Western Hemisphere, which were considered to be the monopoly of American entrepreneurs, and were thus forbidden for other (European) companies.
Prior to World War II, it was already clear that the U.S. considered itself sovereign over the entire continent; its fiat should be law for all subjects living in Latin America. U.S. policy makers regarded their country as invulnerable against all other powers, because of its isolated position and infinite resources. In South America, the U.S. would not permit other (European) countries to become involved. As for Central America, it was deemed justified to control the countries in this part of the continent from the viewpoint of national interest and safety.
Some examples of interference: Chile
In the 1960s, before Salvador Allende took office, the wealthiest 5 % of the Chilean population received more than 25 % of the country’s total income. In September 1970, Allende, candidate of the left-wing parties in Chile (Unidad Nacional), won the elections on a by all standards moderate programme promising some social improvement for low-income classes. U.S. governments, in consultation with multinational corporations (ITT Telecom, Anaconda Copper, Pepsi, for instance)[3] spent large amounts of money to prevent Allende’s election, for they feared ‘negative developments’, such as nationalizations and land reforms. Allende had run for president before, but in 1963 U.S. corporations had successfully supported Christian democrat Eduardo Frei in his run for presidency.
Before the 1970 elections, the Nixon administration had warned that the left-wing candidate had a communist past and, if elected, he could be a model for the region and even for Europe (France and Italy). Although Allende won the elections, he did not have the required 50 % of the total votes (he reached 36 %), so Chilean Congress had to decide who was to be the new president. Eventually, Allende was elected. Pretty soon, he nationalized the holdings of copper mining companies owned by U.S. citizens. Consequently, President Nixon ordered the CIA to destabilize the Chilean government, which resulted in a coup staged by the Chilean army in which Allende was murdered (11th September 1973). The military junta installed a new president, who proved to be a merciless conservative dictator with precious little respect for human rights. However, while this General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte was in office, the U.S. did not have to fear sudden nationalizations or other failures to respect their interests. Meanwhile, the Chilean population suffered from mass arrests, large-scale torture and ‘disappearances’. Political opposition was non-existent. Ministers who favoured some liberalisation - for example, Sergio Jarpa and Luiz Escobar - were quickly replaced. A coup backed by the U.S. thus resulted in the assassination of a democratically elected president, and the installation of a ruthless dictator, who remained in power for almost two decades.[4] Thirty years later, the Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the 1973 Chilean coup was not a part of American history that U.S. citizens should be proud of.
Guatemala
This Central American country had an even worse record than Chile with regard to social equity: around 1950, a mere 2 % of the 3 million inhabitants owned 70 % of the land. In November 1951, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was elected president. He had been Minister of Defence under President Arevalo, who had started a social welfare programme and established a Labour Code. Arbenz promised land reforms in a country where the United Fruit Company (UFC, now Chiquita Banana) had largely dominated the economy. Historically, UFC had had almost unlimited use of Guatemala’s best land, and had been exempt from paying taxes since the end of the 19th century. In 1952, President Arbenz passed the Agrarian Reform Law, which made it possible for land to be redistributed among landless peasants. One year later, the president put this law into practice by expropriating 200,000 acres of uncultivated land owned by the UFC in order to redistribute it. Although Arbenz offered to compensate the UF Company by paying $ 600.000, UFC refused and demanded over 15 million dollars.
On account of the agrarian and educational reform instigated and favoured by Arbenz, the U.S. embassy and the Truman administration feared communist influence in Arbenz’ government (although no avowed communist actually held a post in his cabinet). From 1953 onwards, the CIA attempted to overthrow the government in an operation known as ‘El Diablo’: the CIA funded the equipment, training and payment of rebellion forces. The CIA and United Fruit together convinced exiled colonel Carlos Castillo Armas to lead the coup. Headquarters were established in neighbouring Honduras and Nicaragua. These preparations resulted in Arbenz accusation that the U.S. was intervening in his domestic affairs, whereupon he requested military help from Moscow. The U.S. administration then successfully isolated Arbenz’ government within the Organisation of American States (OAS). On 18th June 1954, Castillo Armas crossed the border with several armed supporters. Only 9 days later, Arbenz’ government collapsed. While U.S. government had hoped for popular support from the local population - by revolting against their president - it was in fact the U.S. pilots bombing Guatemala City that settled it. When Arbenz (who fled the country) asked the United Nations Security Council to condemn this U.S. interference, U.S. officials claimed that the dispute did not fall under U.N., but instead O.A.S. jurisdiction. Castillo Armas seized power and halted Guatemalan literacy and social welfare programmes. Not surprisingly, the new government returned the expropriated land to the United Fruit Company. The regime received an unprecedented package of $ 80 million dollars U.S. aid. The coup against a progressive president, organized by the CIA and private companies thus resulted in a long period of repressive governments, which suspended constitutional liberties and demonstrated little respect for democracy and human rights in Guatemala.[5]
Three decades later, in March 1982, General Efraín Rios Montt assumed power in a coup d’état led by a group of young colonels. Although this general seemed more moderate than his notoriously cruel predecessor Lucas García, he soon proved to be a religious fanatic who believed that he was acting on God’s orders to fight communism. Several human rights movements have documented over 800 killings and disappearances each month during the year and a half of Rios Montt’s presidency.[6] His poor record concerning human rights and his reputation for massacres and ‘disappearances’ notwithstanding, the Reagan administration still supported the General quite enthusiastically. Reagan portrayed Rios Montt as a man of great personal integrity and commitment, totally dedicated to democracy. Although U.S. Congress had cut off military aid to Guatemala in 1977, the Reagan administration considered the more ‘respectable’ general Rios Montt to be a reason to restore military relations. In sum, the Reagan administration gave Rios Montt completely free rein to the way he wished to combat the opposition (although this implicated state terror against the - rural and indigenous - population) as long as he combated left-wing movements and prevented Guatemala from becoming a communist country.
Rios Montt used the tactic of ‘frijoles y fusiles’ (beans and guns) to tackle the guerrilla: peasants had the option of helping the government, for which they would receive beans and a gun. If they refused, they would be incarcerated in a military camp. Soldiers would disguise themselves as rebels in order to commit kidnappings and killings, or to verify the loyalty of the villagers. The press was censured, for it was forbidden to publish news that might cause confusion or panic or aggravate the situation. Many Indians in villages far away from the capital were put together in ‘model villages’, which in truth boiled down to concentration camps.
According to the Truth Commission installed by the UN, the civil war - which started when the CIA overthrew president Arbenz and ended in the beginning of the nineties - led to more than 200.000 victims. The period of Lucas García and Rios Montt is even referred to as the ‘silent holocaust’. When President Clinton visited Guatemala, he apologized for U.S. involvement in the country, stating that support for military forces that engaged in violent repression was wrong, and the United States must not repeat this mistake. Whether the future U.S. policy makers will learn this lesson is yet to be seen.
Nicaragua
U.S. intervention in this country started in 1854 when the U.S. navy bombarded and destroyed the Nicaraguan port town of San Juan del Norte. This attack took place after U.S. millionaire Cornelius Vanderbilt sailed his yacht into the port of San Juan and an official attempted to levy charges on his boat. One year later, American adventurer William Walker seized power after having invaded the country with a private army and declared himself to be president of the territory. Direct American intervention then stopped until the beginning of the 20th century when the ‘liberal’ dictator José Santos Zelaya (1893-1909) was driven out by the U.S, which was followed by a period in which Nicaragua was practically a protectorate of the U.S. This U.S. occupation, which (with a pause between 1925 and 1927) continued until 1933, was an important cause for the emergence of the guerrilla movement led by Augusto César Sandino. In 1934, however, the National Guard, an institution created by the U.S., murdered Sandino and repressed the population in a brutal fashion. In 1937, General Anastazio Somoza took power, supported by both conservatives and liberals. Murdered in 1956, his sons continued the presidency until the end of the 1970s. By the end of this decade, local companies had turned against them and in August 1978, Edén Pastora took up residence the Presidential Palace. President Carter, however, continued to support the Somoza regime until the very end. When it had become completely impossible to back Somoza, the Carter administration tried to do everything it could to support the National Guard and to prevent the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) from taking power. When this failed, U.S. government suddenly became increasingly concerned about human rights and democracy in Nicaragua.
In 1984, the Sandinista government assumed power and Daniel Ortega became president (elected by 60 % of the popular vote). This government improved the health and nutrition situation in the country and tried to implement a rather more progressive policy. National Guard elements, however, reorganized their forces around the Honduran border. These movements came to be known as the ‘Contras’. The most extensive Contra group was the Fundación Democrática Nicaragüense (FDN) led by Adolfo Calero, in which former supporters of Somoza were of paramount importance. The Reagan administration suspected the Sandinista government of being influenced by Cuba and the Soviet Union and once again feared the spread of communism in Latin America. The U.S. State Department believed Nicaraguan government had sent weapons to a Salvadoran guerrilla movement (FMLN), which tried to overthrow President Duarte’s government.
The Reagan administration then decided to send covert aid to the Contras, who were seen as ‘freedom fighters’.[7] The CIA (and later the National Security Council) directly helped these Contras in blowing up bridges, smuggling arms and toppling the Sandinista’s regime.[8] By November 1983, U.S. Congress permitted 24 million dollars for aid to the Contras. In 1985, however, the Congress refused to allow President Reagan to support FDN any longer. Consequently, Reagan launched a trade boycott against Nicaragua. The same year, Secretary of State Shultz suspended negotiations with Nicaragua because they would not result in anything. In the meantime, Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela (together the Contadora group) tried to mediate. Direct U.S. intervention in Nicaragua more or less stopped when the Cold War ended and President Bush sr. started his ‘new world order’. A policy of benign neglect was adopted towards Nicaragua. After a petition from the Nicaraguan side, the International Court of Justice condemned the U.S. for its actions in Nicaragua during the Reagan administration.
Colombia
In Colombia, drugs have always formed an excellent pretext for Washington to intervene in domestic affairs. Greatly simplifying the complicated struggle between left-wing guerrilla movements FARC and ELN on the one hand, and the government and the paramilitary (AUC) on the other,[9] State Department policy makers nicknamed the FARC ‘narcoguerrilla’s’, thus denying the involvement of other actors in the drugs business. In fact, Castaño’s ‘Autodefensas’ and the Colombian state itself also profit from trafficking drugs.[10] Most notorious in this context is President Samper (1994-1998) who received money from the Cali drugs cartel (the Rodriguez brothers) for his presidential campaign in exchange for the political protection of the Rodriguez’ and the promise not to extradite them to the U.S. After rumours of this deal arose, Samper had to spend a great deal of his presidency denying ties with drugs money. The Clinton administration was convinced that drugs financed his campaign to a considerable extent and eventually refused him a visa to visit the U.S. Samper was, therefore, unable to visit the UN headquarters in New York whenever he wanted.[11]
In 1999, president Clinton started his Plan Colombia, which was essentially an unprecedented packet of U.S. aid to Colombia ($ 1.3 billion). Much criticised by several NGO’s for the disproportionate concentration on military aspects in the Plan (instead of a humanitarian focus), the Plan did not provide alternatives for the peasants who depend on growing coca for their subsistence. However, Colombian and U.S. government agreed to tackle drugs production and traffic. Colombians found fault with their President Pastrana (1998-2002) for not having presented the Plan to his own congress before giving his consent to Clinton. Although the Plan was officially presented as a Colombian initiative, the first version was in English. Pastrana asked the European Union for additional aid, but it refused to participate in the context of the Plan Colombia for its overemphasis on military aspects and lack of alternatives for the poor coca peasants. Both Colombia and the U.S. came under increasing international criticism when it turned out that the chemicals used to destroy the coca cause great harm to local population and the ecosystem (but did not prevent the coca from regrowing within a few months).
Pastrana’s successor Uribe Vélez used the attacks on the twin towers in 2001 to launch an internal ‘war on terror’ against the FARC guerrilla (now nicknamed ‘narcoterrorists’) and declared a state of emergency after just two weeks in office, which allowed him to govern by Decree. Although respect for human rights has clearly diminished since Uribe took office, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that Uribe has ‘developed a great strategy to combat the phenomenon of insecurity and terrorism’.[12]
Meanwhile, the war on drugs will remain a reason for Washington to be closely involved in Colombian politics and thus in Colombia’s civil war also. Via ‘Forward Operating Locations’ (among others on the Dutch Antilles) - which are officially destined for the war on drugs - the U.S. army keeps a close eye on what happens on Colombian territory.[13] Since the attacks on the World Trade Centre, however, Washington’s attention has not been particularly directed towards their Southern neighbours. Whether the Plan Colombia will have a follow-up is quite uncertain.
Conclusion
U.S. intervention in Latin America follows a long-standing historical pattern, rather than being based on individual incidents. In several countries, U.S. officials have created the climates in which a coup led by the internal opposition was made possible. Since the beginning of the Monroe Doctrine, but especially since the Cold War, there have been numerous examples of overt and covert support by the U.S. to armed opposition groups in order to overthrow Latin American governments. A puppet government was then established, or at least a political class put in place that would respect U.S. interests. Whether this new government respected human rights or had attention for its own people was of lesser importance. In many of these direct and indirect operations, the CIA was involved, as were several multinational private enterprises. In different cases, Washington played a divisive role in the society in which it had interfered; a division that remained evident well after any direct intervention had ended.
Fear of the European powers led to the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine. This anxiety was the Leitmotiv until the First World War and was especially directed towards Spain, France and the UK, the most important potential European intruders. After the Second World War, fear of communism and the spread of this ideology in the U.S.’s own backyard evolved into the main cause for intervention. The example of the successful communist coup in Cuba was especially frightening for Washington. This was the context in which the interventions in Chile, Guatemala and Nicaragua (during the Reagan administration) took place. Strangely enough, U.S. policy makers actually succeeded in convincing the public of the ‘danger’ of tiny countries, such as Guatemala or El Salvador. It was as if when Guatemala would be communist, the U.S. would have to fear for its future. After the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War, the ‘war on drugs’ was the pretext par excellence for interference in Latin America. During the 1990s and the Clinton administration, this obsession with drugs led to the increased involvement of the U.S. in Colombia and, to a lesser extent, in Bolivia.
On the whole, there are two lines of argument that may be distinguished in justifying U.S. involvement in Latin American countries. First of all, moral arguments are used: the U.S. is supposed to bring democracy, freedom and welfare to the country involved. In order words, it is in the interest of the country itself that Washington influences domestic politics. It is presented as a duty for the U.S, which it fulfils reluctantly, almost against its own will. On the other hand, the interests of the U.S. are also presented as an important and valuable argument: the USA cannot permit communists (or drugs traffickers, terrorists) living in their own backyard. U.S. national interest and safety are thus used as an argument. This line has been clearly manifest since the time of President Wilson and was especially evident in the case of the Panama canal.
Now, since 9-11, the ‘war on terrorism’ is the new Leitmotiv for U.S. foreign policy. The Bush jr. administration seems to be more concerned with other regions in the world than with Latin America. Whether this new geographical attention will have positive implications for Latin America (and their function as a ‘finca’ for the ‘gringos’) is yet to be seen.
Published on 14 January 2004 by RISQ
© Pieter Smidt van Gelder | www.risq.org
All rights reserved.
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