A new dawn is breaking. Grey-suited men working in bureaucracies are no longer feared. Citizens are led to believe that government has no power, because the multinational knows best, and it will flee if it thinks government intends interfering in its affairs. In an age in which the power of the multinationals matter more than the power of the people, trade has become the key to what free-trade proponents would call freedom; and detractors of liberalisation, a new Pandora’s box.

The European Commissioner for Trade Pascal Lamy, shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks, in 2001, argued in a press conference (find WTOIL reference) that “trade is the key to development.” Countless others have attempted to promote this neo-liberal idea, including a whole cross-section of the EU. More recently, former Director-General of the WTO Mike Moore, in a speech at a two-day meeting to present the WTO “benefits” to Eastern European countries, argued that “WTO membership and trade liberalisation can help to foster prosperity, stability and peace.[1]" Questioned by civil society (indicate the debates], the European Commission, by using the tag-line of development as justification for liberalisation, has argued that the debate is out of its hands.[2]

This line of argument, arguably, would be music to the ears of the European Union, because it has conveniently enabled them to sideswipe the charge of liberalisation as a condition for the process of development in developing countries by maintaining that it falls under the remit of the WTO. For example, the European Union has promulgated the Cotonou Agreement as a necessary condition for the 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) developing countries to be lifted out of poverty, and be provided for development. Strict adherence to the EU’s plans will mean that countries in Africa-more specifically, regions-- will be able to become compatible with the World Trade Organisation’s rules-based system. This formidable facilitator of liberalised trade, the WTO, is the first in line of the New Crusaders. The question, however, is how development-friendly is it? Before I try to answer that, however, it is necessary to elucidate the dynamics of the behemoth one knows as the WTO.

Since the World Trade Organisation was established following the Treaty of Marrakech, in 1995, it has operated under a false claim. It has claimed to be working in the interests of developing countries, least developed countries[3], and more importantly, development. It would take till November 2001 - just two months after the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York & Washington - for the trade talks at Doha, Qatar, to take place, and for the world organisation to come out with a so-called “development agenda.”[4]

This sudden desire to call the Doha talks a development one holds one critical implication - that the theme of development had been absent in previous rounds-notably: Kennedy; Tokyo; and Uruguay Rounds. It is also not surprising that this development should take place, especially after the debacle at Seattle in 1999.

It is my contention that development may have been the claim, but an agenda predicated on development has not been the aim. In February this year, when I asked an official from the EU’s trade-policy machinery for the member states - the so-called Committee 133 - what constituted development, he was quick to point out that market access was right at the top.[5] It goes without saying that market-access without a certain level of development is futile. If developing countries lack appropriate infrastructure for domestic regulation, or monitoring, of trade rules, then, automatically, they operate at a huge disadvantage.

This, inevitably, betrays the WTO, in essence, as a world organisation dedicated exclusively to the promotion of global trade, which means that it has no mandate whatsoever for development-oriented policy. The United Nations’ official version of what work the WTO does is not far off. It lists three objectives of the WTO as: firstly, “to help trade flow as freely as possible”; secondly, “to achieve further liberalisation gradually though negotiation”; and finally, to establish “an impartial means of settling disputes”[6]. The WTO’s booklet comes sufficiently close, calling the institution a “multilateral” one that is “dedicated to helping build prosperity for all peoples of the globe by bolstering a free and fair trading. [system]”[7] However, in that short definition lies the smoking gun-that which betrays the WTO’s intentions-free trade. To scratch beneath the surface of the rhetoric coming out of the WTO, you would find that WTO trade is of a different ilk. Some would even go as far as to argue that trade liberalisation under the WTO is anathema to development.

In fact, according to one Geneva diplomat[8], “the WTO is not a development organization and we do not want to transform it into one. However, it has acquired a developmental dimension, which is becoming more important with the attainment of universal membership.”[9] This would seem to suggest that the more members there are in the WTO, the more development-oriented it would be. This, frankly, is a specious argument, because the implication here already, is that the very idea of development has been sorely and woefully absent since 1995. Besides, accession to the WTO, as testified by UNCTAD’s exhaustive book (see footnote n#8), is indicative of how problematic membership remains.

Nonetheless, the diplomat’s account is a refreshingly honest one from a government official, and even if it says nothing, it gives one more of an idea of what some of the top negotiators of the West think about the WTO. Sadly, but not unexpectedly, candour of this degree is absent from official WTO documents. Conversely, such thinking does still abound in the academic community. Rugman, cited earlier, is one of those, who argue that he does not “see the WTO as a relevant forum for the redress of perceived global income inequalities across the North-South dimension.”[10] Instead, he attributes its progress to the liberalisation of trade “in goods between the major “triads” of North America, the EU and Japan.”[11]

For Rugman, in his classic business-like cosmology, the World Trade Organisation “embodies several asymmetric elements, on the one hand consistently moving towards trade liberalisation, but on the other, being unable to eliminate the quasi-protectionist policies in some sectors by many of its members.”[12] If what this essentially means is that the WTO is a facilitator of trade liberalisation, how can it possibly be open to development?[13]

In the context of regionalism, this realisation of the absence of development is disturbing, because it betrays the whims of another new crusader-the European Union, and its strategy as one predicated on the exploitation of its so-called partners. This claim is not without reason. A long time before the negotiations of September 2002 to bring the ACP countries into the WTO-compatibility mode began, the European Union argued that the Economic Partnership Agreements were necessary to ensure that its partners integrate into the global economy. Furthermore, the ACP countries were promised that by entering negotiations on EPAs, this would help foster poverty-eradication. However, given that the WTO has no explicit mandate for development, or poverty-eradication, it looks like the ACP countries have been served a cold dish of lip-service.

1.2 The European Union-The Hand That Rocks the Cradle?

“Better to have a handful of might than a sack of justice.” (Czech Proverb)

William Rose Wallace once wrote, “the hand that rocks the cradle is the hand that rules the world.” This allegory could befit the European Union in its relationship with the 77 countries of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific: since 1975, the so-called Lome Accords[14] have come to symbolise the EU’s co-operation with the ACP Group. So long has the agreement been in existence that it has lent the British and the French, whose former colonies mostly comprise the group, leverage that can be considered unique in the context of North-South relations.

It is unique because no other two European countries enjoy the priviledge of being actively involved with what is potentially a huge market than those two countries, whose dependants are littered all over the continent in what is fast emerging to be regional groupings. This makes it important for the members of the European Union, as a whole, to benefit from this relationship so that they can collectively offset their rival in trade-the United States. If this makes it seem like it is a competition, it is with good grounds. The speed with which the European Union is pursuing the so-called Economic Partnership Agreements, especially when modalities (footnote: Shefali Sharmla’s article-TOR) have yet to be fully-fleshed out in the run-up to the Fifth Ministerial Conference to be held in Cancun, is disturbing.

Consequently, what is emerging is a European Union-essentially “the world’s largest trading bloc”[15]-that is fast transforming itself into a powerful economic actor in international trade. According to Bretherton and Volger, “the EU has begun to acquire actor-like characteristics in global monetary politics even if the approach continues to be intergovernmental.”[16] This is a significant point, for the arrival of the Euro in January 2002 into a political and economic reality has lent Europe not only the prestige of a power broker, but also given it considerable economic clout with regard to its relations vis-a-vis its ACP partners. Especially so now because it has put the European Union on somewhat of a pedestal within observers of regional integration, who would feel compelled to view this dynamic as a model to be emulated.

Members of the ACP may see themselves as de facto partners of the Europeans, but it goes without saying that the ACP countries are weak, with most of them falling under the category of the so-called LDCs[17]. However, their dependence on what was the European Economic Community up until 1992 when it became a truly homogenous European “Union”, is noteworthy. It is arguable that this cooperation-tenuous as it may be-has enabled the EU to be represented en bloc at international gatherings, such as the United Nations. It would be understandable if the United States viewed this allegiance with a bit of a green eye.[18] More substantially, the EU-US trade war that eventuated in 1999[19] can be seen as an epitome of the level of frustration by the US vis-à-vis the EU, which is an “actor” in its own right. This contention is not predicated merely on an assumption; the statistics of the EU’s growing power is undeniable: “the Community itself maintains 127 overseas delegations and in return 164 states have established permanent diplomatic Missions to the Community/Union.”[20]

Whilst maintaining many delegations overseas may not necessarily reflect the strength of the EU as an actor, it is an explicit indication of its aspirations. Implicit in the use of the word “actor” with regard to the EU, is somewhat of a realization that the European Union has acquired a Realist character. This means that, in the context of international relations, the EU can be perceived to be an actor in its own right--acknowledged as such by Bretherton & Volger-seeking to maximise its (own) interests in the face of a contemporary economic system that is becoming increasingly polarised into different blocs.[21] They contend that out of a “three-bloc configuration[22]”, the “third most coherent and equally expansionist point is represented by the EU.” [23]

It goes without saying, therefore, that as much as the European Union may purport to, say, promote and foster regional integration in developing countries, such proclamations of support are only constructive if they can be employed as strategies to offset any potential efforts by their transatlantic cousins in the United States who may feel compelled, in turn, to engage with developing countries. Ultimately, this cloak-and-dagger behaviour transcends the idea of the EU as a power in the global economy, and transforms EU-US relations within the global economy into a game about power politics. Bretherton and Volger lend credence to this idea when they argue that: “there is…a wider political view in which the European Union as an actor has consciously arranged its trade preferences according to a set of political and strategic rather than simply economic purposes.”[24] As I will argue, this political and strategic purpose is only meaningful once the United States comes into the bigger scheme of things.

1.2 The United States-Predatory Crusader?

“Today…the United States is approaching a folly…It is helping to bring about what it cannot want: the hardening of world politics into three regional blocs-in Europe, East Asia, and the Americas-each organised around a powerful industrial and economic base, and each liable to be suspicious of the others”
-Bernard K Gordon

As the final actor in the line of New Crusaders, the United States is, arguably, the “greatest exponent of a modern and amoral realpolitik”[25]. In 2001, it refused to ratify Kyoto Protocol on the grounds that it would hurt business; it has failed to ratify the International Criminal Court; and in last trade talks in Doha, it obtained a notorious reputation for bully-boy tactics[26], which comprised calling up members of developing countries to warn them that if they took particular stances on the negotiations, they would forfeit any aid that would come their way. To boot, it is the worst in providing development assistance, providing, according to UNCTAD’s statistics, only 0.1% of ODA..

Far from belabouring the point of the United States as a so-called Bad Kid on the Trade Block, I believe it is important to position it in the context of serious and critical negotiations that it tends to dismiss as cosmetic when, in reality, its arrogance, and lip-service is so evidently seen by all. These negotiations include, a priori, the most crucial of all-the upcoming Fifth Ministerial WTO Conference in Cancun, Mexico, where the US is to wrangle with the EU over the issue of agriculture. At the time of writing, a mini-ministerial held in Tokyo, which comprised 22 WTO members, failed to agree over access to medicines for developing countries; and agriculture. This means that the next few months are going to be even more problematic for smaller countries that will necessarily have to concede to certain modalities in order to win favour of aid from the US.

More significantly, what makes the US such an avid crusader is its unique strategy predicated on what I would call alliances. On the face of it, it is arguable that alliances, ipso facto, mean little. Some would even go as far as argue that alliances in such a context are not only inevitable, but also necessary. However, with the US, it is worth scratching beyond the surface. In an effort to break up possible coalitions, it has consistently created free-trade areas in South East Asia and the Americas in order to dovetail the regional projects within that region. For example, it has recently signed a free-trade agreement with Chile, which happens to be an associate member of the MERCOSUR grouping. This is significant as it testifies to the US’s crusade to disturb, by any means necessary, any possible coalitions of the willing -especially that of MERCOSUR which Brazil’s President-elect Lula da Silva has pledged to protect- that could upset its plans for the so-called Free-trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) that has been scheduled for 2005.

Dot Keet, Senior Researcher at the School of Government, University of the Western Cape[27] is quick, however, to point to the US’s plans as predicated on the desire to maximise opportunities for its multinational corporations. This argument does not sit awry with other commentators, such as Marianne H Marchand[28], who argues in her essay, entitled “North American Regionalisms and Regionalization in the 1990s.”, that out of the three major explanations “for the sudden interest among the region’s political and economic elites in constructing a regional free-trade bloc.[29]”, is one explanation that “focuses primarily on the perceived threat from the EU and East Asia.[30]”.

Perceived though the threat of the EU and Asia may be to the US, it does lend credence to the idea that the US is unsettled by the shifts in regional politicking, prompting speculation that there may be a few more raised eyebrows in the current Bush administration than currently expected. If there is serious concern, then it is plausible that most likely, it is over the future of US multinationals, and the extent to which they can penetrate markets.

Marchand maintains that on the one hand, “American companies were increasingly wary of competition from European, Japanese and South Korean companies.[31]”; on the other, “the relaunching of the EU’s integration process from 1985 on was seen as the creation of a ‘Fortress Europe’ by the US administration and the business community.” She concludes ominously that “in response, American economic and political elites started to search for an appropriate answer.[32]”. It is arguable that this answer was most probably NAFTA.

Keet corroborates this point when she argues that NAFTA was actually created as a need for the US to “influence and engage with the global economy[33].”.However, Keet contends that the decision for NAFTA was taken way back at the start of the Uruguay round, which culminated in the formation of the World Trade Organisation in 1995. Even at that time, she maintains, “the US was actively securing its free-trade area with Canada and planning the extension and consolidation of its regional base into the Americas, starting with Mexico.” Echoing Marchand’s aforementioned analysis, she opines that “NAFTA is still proving to be a useful , and support, to the US national economy”, because “it provides a larger, intermediate, regional base from which US TNCs can engage with the global economy.” [34]

This so-called engagement with the global economy is significant, because if it says nothing, it is an indication of the extent to which the multinational has become somewhat of a vestigial appendix at the core of the American mindset. Already, it is becoming common knowledge that a substantial amount of world trade is handled by TNCs. According to Noreena Hertz who provides us with more statistics, these corporations “fed to bursting by global laissez-faire capitalism, are now as big as nation states.”[35] This enables them to invest all over the globe, and what better way to gain financial hegemony than to ensure that these multinationals become the greatest exponents, and facilitators of US trade policy.

What this indicates is that US trade policy is less strategic, but more predatory. After all, as much as TNCs may represent the quintessential purveyors of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), their atavistic propensity for profit at the expense of human development has been the basis upon which many an NGO has tried to bring pressure to bear on them to regulate.

However, given the arduous efforts of civil society to regulate these transnational companies, and their equally woeful attempts to restrain the power of TNCs, these corporations have become significantly powerful. Consequently, it has become very difficult to make them accountable due to their many overseas subsidiaries. For example, many TNCs are chartered in nations, principalities or provincial-level states, as in the United States, which compete to offer TNCs the most lax charters with the fewest requirements for auditing.[36] It is easy to see how such difficult-to-regulate, and amorphous organisations would be placed in good stead to exploit the vacuum that nature abhors.

This vacuum would be filled, par excellence, by a free-trade area, as exemplified by the formation of NAFTA, comprising Canada, USA, and Mexico. As Bill Rosenberg[37] notes, since the emphasis of the early 80s and 90s “was to…free-trade from government-imposed regulation[38]”, the WTO was established, and the EU, increasing its membership, removed further trade and investment barriers[39]. Rosenberg also points to the fact that it was at this same time that, rather auspiciously for the US, NAFTA was created. It is plausible to suggest that the creation of this free-trade area in 1994 was perhaps the start of something not so much big as characteristically predatory. The United States had begun to transform its neoliberal paradigm into a reality that could not be ignored by any bloc -- least of all, the European Union.

For a putative hegemon such as the United States, competing with the European Union could not be more important. The EU is indisputably an actor in its own right, and has tremendous clout, especially because of its association with the ACP countries. This alone is sufficient to irk the US, and trigger it to seek new alliances[40] that are strategic, and that aim to obviate the power of the EU. Whether or not such new alliances are predatory is a moot point. However, it clearly demonstrates the growing tensions between that which rocks the cradle of the economy of most African countries, and that which seeks favour, above all else, for its multinationals that are, by nature, averse to development.

1.4 Conclusion

In the final analysis, it is arguable that emerging from the impending new dawn are the vestiges of a clique of New Crusaders that are both expansionist and powerful. The WTO, like the EU and the US, are both expanding their influence beyond their prescriptions of development. The WTO continues to enter the domain of public services by way of the General Agreement on Trade & Services[41], with the complicity of these two powerful actors.

More significantly, the EU and the US, like latter-day marauders, are no longer content to expand their influence within their respective regions alone; rather they are expanding beyond their borders, with the EU targeting 77 developing countries, through the Cotonou Agreement; whilst the US looks to Asia and APEC as a conduit by which to strengthen its hand within the region. Unlike the crusaders of yore, these new condottières do not brandish swords ready to kill any dissenting infidels. Theirs, as I shall argue, is a subtler strategy.

Such are the designs of the New Crusaders, but what of their religion?