There are a variety of reasons, which can at least partly explain the unfavourable situation of Africa compared to the rest of the world. The rapid colonisation and sudden decolonisation left the continent in a state of shock. After the departure of the colonisers, the new states proved to be weak if not artificial constructions. Between 1963 and 1997, the continent has experienced more than seventy ‘coups d’état’. During the cold war, and especially from 1975 on, the US and the Soviet Union were intensively involved in parts of the continent, notably the Horn and Southern Africa. In the meantime, the European countries generally still had some measure of attention for their former colonies. When the cold war ended, Africa lost most of its geopolitical importance. Rather than loyalty to liberalism or communism, other conditions for aid and assistance were imposed upon Africa, such as respect for human rights and free multiparty elections.

Now, at the beginning of the 21^st century, it seems that new modalities of development assistance are needed. Although the industrial countries spend (almost without exception) part of their budget on development aid, the official recommendation of the UN is that the wealthy countries spend 0.7 % of their GNI on development assistance. Most of the industrialised countries, however, including the wealthiest (US, Japan, France) come closer to 0.3 %. Moreover, the considerable subsidies given by Western governments to their own agriculture impede a fair access of African primary products to Western markets.

Relations between Europe and Africa: exploration, colonisation and decolonisation

Around 1500 European colonisers discovered Africa and began to use the people of Western Africa as a work force. The slave trade, in which notoriously the Dutch, the Portuguese and the English participated, deprived the continent of a considerable part of the male population in their productive age. The Europeans were not the only ones to blame, though, for slave structures already existed before the arrival of the colonisers. Once the Europeans were exploring the lands, the local elites often helped them in the slave trade. Nonetheless, this forced emigration of healthy young men obviously did not have positive effects on the development of the regions involved.

Centuries later, in 1884 to be exact, the European colonizers divided the continent as if it was a piece of cake (Conference of Berlin). The colonial powers decided that whoever controlled the coast, could rule over the interior of a territory. The ‘big rulers’ shared among each other several countries, most of the time without having set foot on the land. One literally used the map and the ruler, to which the present dead straight boarders between African countries still testify. One of the consequences of this division system was that tribes, which originally did not belong together at all, were put together all of a sudden in a entirely new ‘country’, whereas other tribes were separated as a consequence of the new boarders of the European intruders. Long before the Conference of Berlin, many explorations had already taken place, notably at the African coasts where the Europeans had begun to colonise Africa. Several European countries had their own companies of exploration, like the Compagnie Française d´Afrique équatoriale or the Deutsche Ostafrika Gesellschaft or the Imperial British East African Company.

The European powers had very different motives for their colonisation. While the English were above all interested in trade and economic relations, the French motives to colonise were political; an extended French empire overseas would help to recover the French prestige. The French colonisers actually strived for one extended area to build up a Francafrique, which they achieved in Western Africa in the end. Although the decolonisation is completed, it is evident that political motives of prestige still play a significant role in French domestic politics; the African francophone countries are considered to symbolise the French power in the world (against the US hegemony). The CFA Franc,[1] the economic and even military involvement and the annual Franco-African summit still testify to this policy. Virtually all the French presidents had personal ties of friendship with French speaking leaders in Africa and appointed confidants in charge of African relations, like Mitterrand did with his son Jean-Christophe ´papamadit’.[2]

The Portuguese, however, had religious motives for their colonisation, because they wanted to explore the continent and spread the Christian faith. Once their colonies Mozambique and Angola had become independent, it was conspicuous that the Portuguese had spent little effort to create an educated class that could rule the country. Primary education was well organised; high schools however were very scarce and to attend University one had to go to Portugal. The same in fact happened in Belgian Congo / Zaire, where the Belgians considered it to be their obligation to educate the people without alienating them from their own culture. In practice, this meant that education and handing over political responsibility took place at a very slow pace.[3] For the Italians and Germans, finally, it was important ‘not to miss the boat’ and to get their peace of the cake. However, Italy had great difficulties to get Ethiopia and Somaliland under its control, while Germany was forced to give up its colonies (Togo, Tanzania, Namibia) after its defeat in World War I.   

After World War II, the world’s Superpowers and especially the United States decided that the concepts of ‘colony’ and ‘colonizer’ were phenomena of an other epoch and thus the (African) colonies should be independent. This policy, though, was not inspired by noble motives to help or protect the indigenous population: the US considered decolonisation above all as an opportunity for trade and economic relations. In October 1960, the General Assembly of the United Nations stated that lack of preparation should not be a reason to ‘postpone the independence’.[4] The same year, sixteen countries acquired independency; in the five years that followed another twenty-two states were created.

It is important to note that the period of colonisation was relatively short. Unlike the colonisation of South-America and Asia for example, which lasted for centuries, the colonisation of Africa lasted more or less from the end of the 19^th century until 1965, the year that most of the African countries became independent. These major events, both the colonisation and the decolonisation were imposed on the continent: the Europeans decided to colonise, whereas the new superpowers after World War II stipulated the independence. In these important decisions Africans had no say at all. 

Before the colonisation of the continent took place, parts of Africa had a long democratic tradition. In some villages, the male population had the right to co decide about the affairs that concerned them directly. After decolonisation, both the former colonising power and the new African leaders tried to implement the European system of democracy. The problem was that many of the basic notions taken for granted in Europe (nation - state - different parties) did not apply to the African reality. To begin with, the newly created countries were not ‘states’ in the way Europeans perceived this concept. There was a great difference between boarders on the map and boarders on the ground. What was called a ‘state’ in the European context proved to be not more than a myth in many African situations. In several cases, a small clan took over, sometimes staying into power for over two decades (the very corrupt but Western backed regime of Mobutu in Zaire and the equally radical and intolerant Mohammed Siad Barre in Somalia for example). Sometimes, it was so unclear for the international community to establish who was in power that the idea of ‘letterbox sovereignty’ was adopted: the people who opened the letters in the presidential palace were to be considered the government. Often, these governments did not control much more than the main buildings in the capital. In other cases, the state lacked effective power over its own territory. Although such a state is recognised by other states in the international system, it does not meet the criterion of empirical statehood: the quasi-state.[5]

When the colonial powers were still in control, there was something like a common enemy, which local opponents could try to defeat (in Angola and Mozambique for example). But once the Europeans left, it soon became clear that this common enemy was not the same as national unity. Paradoxically enough, the new independent countries tried to seek help from the former colonial power. Often, this was the only contact they had with states outside the continent. Furthermore, there were already important economic links with the European countries, which could virtually always deliver military aid and political structures. The language that the new African political class used was often that of the former motherland. Nevertheless, the intensity of this relationship differed a lot from one country to another, depending on the capacities of the former colonial power. Generally, the former colonies of France and the UK were better equipped to perform a successful transition to independence. These two European countries maintained quite intensive economic and political relations with their former colonies and were, through their permanent membership of the UN Security Council, able to give them some protection. A relation with one of the ‘big countries’ however, did not in every case prevent the new countries from internal disorder, as proved the cases of Chad and Uganda. The colonies of the smaller European countries on the other hand, such as Belgium and Portugal, lived through much more chaotic transitions to independence. These European countries lacked the capacity to maintain patron-client relationships to the extent to which France and the UK did.

For regional stability as a whole, it was especially unfortunate that a number of important countries were involved in endless civil wars or very serious internal problems: Ethiopia - Sudan (the biggest country on the continent) - Chad - Angola. Often, an insurgent group could count on the (military) aid of neighbouring states and a foreign ally. In Angola, Cuba and the USSR actively supported the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), while the US backed the rival movements Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) and União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA).

In the case of Ethiopia, there was also a high rate of superpower involvement. The revolutionary regime allied with the Soviet Union, whereas the US and to a lesser extent France tried to support opponents of this regime and neighbouring countries such as Somalia and Sudan. Even China was for a short period involved in domestic politics of an African country when it backed the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).

Whichever road some African countries took to multiparty elections, the distance between the leading elite and the population is still substantial; common people lack confidence in politics and politicians, whom they regard as corrupt. A number of African leaders organized politics entirely around their own person, like Felix Houphouet-Boigny (Côte d’Ivoire) and Haile-Selassie of Ethiopia. These leaders carried out their foreign policy themselves and trusted very few people. Rarely, leaders of this kind handed over power voluntarily. Opposition was either suppressed or co-opted. This ´strong man system´ (which also exists in Sierra Leone and Liberia) results in a persisting loyalty from ministers and public servants to their chief, the president. A political job is attractive, since it creates access to corporations and business. This system of giving away jobs and thus creating loyalty to the president is known as ‘politics of the belly’.[6]

Basic political conditions

With this political chaos at the background, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Western donors were often in the position to require changes of the African governments they helped. They obliged their new African ‘clients’ to have multiparty elections as a political condition for aid. Fair elections have become such a mantra in Western domestic policy that they were even imposed on countries that were evidently not in the position to have them. Such was the case in Sierra Leone, where the country needed above all a period of rest after the civil war. Western donors obliged the government to have elections.

A considerable number of countries do have multiparty elections indeed, though the circumstances are doubtful. In Mali, for instance, president Konaoré promised his predecessor and military putschist Touré to hand over power. And it thus happened. The computer specialist who was the only one to know the code of the central computer counting the votes, died in what appeared to be an accident. During this period, counting of votes was stopped and there was large-scale fraud. However, Mali serves as a great example of democratic progress according to Western donors.

In Nigeria, to take another example, the 1999 elections established Mr. Obasanjo as the President of this most populous country of Africa. It is quite clear, however, that he won the elections thanks to corruption money. In Nigeria, corruption is especially wide spread among police and judges. There are private military groups in order to protect the rich. The army has to protect politicians during their congresses.

In general, the ruling classes consist of a very small elite of urban people, living in great luxury. Their consumption of prestigious goods frequently has a disastrous effect on the local economy. In many cases, there is a considerable gap between this urban elite and the often-rural population, of whom the political class is supposed to take care.

Declining Economies

In many respects, Africa ranks lowest in the world’s economic order. Of the world’s foreign direct investments, only a small part goes to Africa: 11 billion dollar in 2000, whereas 769 billion dollar was directed to Asia and 485 billion to Latin America. Almost all these regions witnessed economic growth during the eighties and nineties, but in the majority of the African countries, the economy stagnated or even declined. In extreme cases, such as Angola or Mozambique, the economic situation was better in 1970 than in 2000.

Many African countries depend on primary products for their export. These products are subjected to highly fluctuating prices due to uncertain demand and supply factors. Hence, it is extremely uncertain what the revenues will be. On the whole, most of the African states depending on one single product experienced a decline in their terms of trade over the past two decades. Moreover, many African economies depend on a very small number of crops or minerals. Directly after decolonisation, the majority of them tried to intensify rather than vary their production. On average, the majority of the continent’s economies were in shambles during the nineties. Most of the countries that concentrated on primary products suffered severe economic losses (Niger, Mozambique and Côte d’Ivoire for instance, lost up to 10 % of their revenues), while those who depended on minerals and oil also saw a decline in their economies (Nigeria and Gabon).

Apart from these official figures, in most of the developing countries there exists a large-scale ‘informal economy’. A substantial part of the population finds its employment in this part of the economy, of which the official data of IMF, World Bank, UN and the countries involved know nothing at all. These economic activities (selling products on the street, taxi driving, etc.) are notoriously difficult to tax, which in turn weakens the position of the state. For the people involved, employment in the informal economies means that they do not earn much, while they have no social security whatsoever, despite working very long hours.

Over time, the direct relation between African countries and the former European colonisers or one of the superpowers was taken over by the IMF and World Bank. From the beginning of the ´80, these institutions started to impose economic changes as a condition for aid. These so called ‘Structural Adjustment Policies’ were for the first time negotiated with Senegal, Kenya, Malawi and Mauritius in 1981. One of the first economic conditions for assistance was that these states with a ‘heavily overvalued domestic currency’ had to devalue their currency, which sometimes led to extreme devaluations. At first, the World Bank’s policy makers were quite suspicious of the (indeed often corrupt) state, which led them to emphasise the role of the market and free trade. In a later stage, however, they were forced to recognise that a strong state is indispensable in the process of development (for instance for taxation and the protection of private property) and adapted their policies accordingly.

Moreover, the economic and the political situation alike improved over the last two years. Since 1990, the number of wars has decreased and some dictatorships (Uganda, Nigeria) have disappeared. Economically, Botswana and Togo are doing well. On the whole, the African economies increased with 3.4 % in 2001. In absolute terms, this progress is very modest, but it is at least a start.

NEPAD

Although the above-presented analysis might lead to the conclusion that there is not much hope, there are initiatives, which leave some room for optimism. After many (western) projects for the development of the continent, a number of African leaders presented new solutions one year ago. Their New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) basically comes down to a target for economic growth of 7 %, which would lead to halving poverty by 2015.[7] This plan would cost 64 billion dollar each year. It is one of the first times African politicians recognize that the present economic misery is caused by ‘weak states and failing economies, worsened by bad leadership and corruption’. The African leaders promise to improve their governance, to respect human rights and to guarantee democracy. In exchange, they ask private investments, development aids, debt relief and more opportunities for export.

The idea for this plan emerged some years ago when the South-African president Mbeki and his Nigerian confrere Obasanjo launched the Millennium Partnership for the Africa Recovery Programme (MAP). President Wade of Senegal answered with his Omega project. The Organisation for African Unity instigated that these two plans would be integrated in the New African Initiative, later called NEPAD. The majority of the African leaders are positive about the idea.

Unlike other development regions (South-America, Asia), Africa depends to a large extent on foreign aid. Aid represents 9.3 per cent of gross national product of sub-Saharan Africa, but only 2.1 per cent for South Asia, and less than 1 per cent for East Asia and Latin America.[8] In some extreme cases, Official Development Assistance (ODA) reached more than one third of the gross national product.[9] In these heavily indebted countries, aid is often used to fill the gaps or pay interests on the loans. In this way, the indebted countries fill one gap with the other: instead of using the aid for investments, which in the end could create employment and wealth, assistance is just used to limit the indebtedness.

In 2001, the EU dedicated 27 billion dollar of official development assistance (ODA) to Africa. This will be 34 billion dollar by 2006. In the same year, the US gave 10 billion dollar ODA to Africa; by 2006 this should be $ 15 billion.[10] At the same time, however, the US and EU together spend $ 360 billion each year on their own agriculture.

The UN has set the norm for industrialised countries to spend 0.7 % of their GNI on official development assistance to developing countries. This is somewhat strange. According to this criterion, the total amount of assistance money depends on the economies of the wealthy countries instead of the needs of the poor countries. Yet, it would help a lot if the industrialised world would meet just this percentage. In the past few years, only Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands reach this norm. Apart from these figures, one should as well consider whether this aid is effective and in what way it is spent.[11] For instance, a great deal of the aid is ´tied’: the recipient country is not free to spend the money the way it would like to. In practice, this often means that the donor country obliges the recipient to buy products and services from their economy, which are not necessarily the cheapest or most necessary ones for the recipient country. In this way, the economy of the donor country profits from development aid as well. Moreover, development aid still strongly follows old patterns of colonisation: related to Africa, the UK spent close to 82 % to Commonwealth states, while the French aid concentrates even more heavily on la Francafrique. The Italian governments also directed their help to countries in which they were historically interested, and even the German development aid was particularly destined to Tanzania and Namibia, although these countries stopped belonging to Germany since 1918.[12]

Conclusion

When the World Bank began with its Structural Adjustment Programmes, there were roughly two opposed views. On the one hand, the majority of the African leaders considered that the European colonisation and the attitude of the superpowers towards the continent in the cold war were responsible for the often miserable economic and political situation. On the other hand, there were those who believed that the African leaders themselves were to blame, their bad leadership and widespread corruption having led to the collapse of the state and hence to economic decay (the view adopted by Western policy makers). Both views undoubtedly present a part of reality. NEPAD recognises for the first time that both factors played a part in the creation of the present situation.

At the beginning of this century, much has to be done to change the present combination of problems. Malnutrition, AIDS, economic misery and political instability are all too often present in African countries. These factors are not only connected with each other, but also strengthen each other. In addition, the demographic transition has resulted in rapidly growing populations in many African countries. At first sight, this seems advantageous, for a young population could help to create economic growth. In reality, there is not enough employment to supply all these people with work and the increase in population will lead (and is already leading) to slums, mass unemployment and urban misery. Birth control is indispensable.

An integrated European policy concerning aid towards sub-Saharan Africa is needed. Member countries should stop concentrating their attention on former colonies and direct their aid to regions where it is most needed. European policy makers should be patient with regard to concepts like free elections and democracy. Although these ideas occupy a central place in Western public opinion, they cannot be simply copied into the African context. Apart from that, they are not often suited as criteria for aid since it is difficult to control and monitor them. In addition, it is absolutely indispensable that the EU (and the US and Japan) gradually stop their domestic agriculture subsidies, so that African products have a fair chance of access into the EU and NAFTA. Both trade and aid are needed to reach the goals formulated in NEPAD.

Notes

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